Combat serves as a laboratory to test new techniques. Unlike peacetime debates over what worked and what didn't, everyone tends to accept things proved in combat. Several such experiments came out of the Kosovo campaign.

No friendly casualties at all will be tolerated. While bloodless victories are always desirable, they are rare. But military technology has been promoted for several decades as the truly magic bullet that would make its users invincible.

The Gulf War - where a well prepared army, trained for decades to face the formidable (on paper, anyway) Red Army, took apart a rather inept and dispirited Iraqi force, - changed the popular attitude toward combat casualties. Our casualties were about the same as they had been for other European armies fighting Middle Eastern armies in the last two centuries. But the techno-enthusiasts saw, not déjà vu, but something new.

The low loss rate of the Gulf War was erroneously attributed to superior technology and seen as a portent for the future. Everyone, especially most American voters, decided that getting Americans killed in combat was no longer acceptable. The politicians heard the voters, and ordered the generals to make it so.

The generals, realizing that their careers were on the line, did what had to be done during the Kosovo war. Bombing was done out of range of anti-aircraft artillery. The electronic warfare aircraft were worked hard to provide radar-jamming protection even for the stealth aircraft (B-2 and F-117) that, in theory, did not need it. No ground troops were used. The generals crossed their fingers and prayed. Finally, after hitting civilian targets (waterworks, bridges and electricity) in Serbia, and backing off on the demand for Kosovo independence, they got the Serbs to give in. Victory was declared, with no American combat losses.

"No losses" is the rule American combat leaders will have to follow in future wars.

Drones are Good - finally. Having been around for several decades, and used successfully by nations like Israel, the U.S. finally is behind UAVs (the buzzword for unpiloted aircraft). Part of this has to do with the new mania for zero casualties. Lose a drone and none of your people are hurt. It was also discovered that you could send a drone in low with a laser target designator, and have a manned aircraft higher up drop bombs, even through the clouds, that the drone's laser would guide to the target.

Digitalization is the Future. Connecting all the tanks, warplanes, artillery and infantry as if they were in an office computer network has been a military goal for most of the 1990s. In Kosovo, there were times when it was possible to pull it off. It wasn't easy, but when it worked, it was great.

How does it work? A recon aircraft points a heat-sensing camera at enemy territory, the picture is sent, via satellite, back to the U.S., where targets are found by powerful computers. The target location is sent back, via satellite, to a U.S. bomber in the vicinity, which then enters the location of the target into a GPS guided bomb, releases the now enlightened bomb, which promptly hits the target. All in minutes. The same thing can be done when some infantryman on the ground sees a choice target. A bomber, artillery or tank fire can be called in - within minutes. Digitalization wasn't universal during the Kosovo campaign, but it was used enough to make everyone a believer.

Electronic Warfare is more important than we thought it was. After the Gulf War, the Air Force agreed to get rid of its highly capable EF-111 electronic warfare aircraft, and pay to use the Navy's equally capable EA-6 aircraft. It saved money, but in Kosovo it was discovered that the need to provide maximum security for aircraft required more electronic warfare aircraft than were available. One reason the F-22 budget was cut recently was to provide money for more desperately needed electronic warfare planes.

Smarter Targeting. Limited wars call for limits on the amount of violence used. Late 20th century wars also are fought in the glare of global mass media attention. You have to look your best while you are killing people and breaking things. This means targets have to be selected with the media and local politics in mind. If you are bombing a nation where you have a faction that favors you, then you have to be careful that bombs do not hit your friends down there. So you don't bomb neighborhoods full of people who hate the local government. Go after the secret police headquarters, and the mansions of corrupt politicians. It was easier in the old days; you just bombed whatever might aid the war effort. But today the war effort includes press conferences, so you bomb the enemy media early on.

Better BDA. Bomb Damage Assessment has, for most of this century, been an afterthought. When you got into the enemy territory you had bombed you discovered that, oops, you had not hit all the targets you thought you had. How could this happen? Simple, the fellows on the ground had a tremendous incentive not to be hit, to make those damn pilots think they did hit something so they wouldn't come back and bomb you again.

After Kosovo, everyone is either denying the Serbs were so clever, or promising the BDA will be better next time. Déjà vu all over again.

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