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"Readiness for What?"

To be ready for war is something everyone can agree is necessary, but no one wants to pay for. The Gulf War was the first time America went to war ready for combat. That's mainly because the largest peacetime budgets ever (peaking at $417 billion in 1987, adjusted for inflation) gave our troops the cash to train. It's been downhill since then.

Shortly after the Iraq war, the Soviet Union disintegrated. The mighty Red Army that America had armed itself to fight for forty years was no more. Who was left to fight? There was still North Korea, but the end of Cold War subsidies from Russia, and years of crop failures and a change in leadership have taken the edge off this threat. Iraq is still under embargo, with its anti-aircraft weapons used as target practice by American warplanes.

With current annual defense spending running at $300 billion, and the armed forces one third smaller than in 1987, there's still money for training, spare parts, ammunition, pay raises and all the other things needed to make troops ready for combat. But there's competition for this money, as well as for the troops' time. In peacetime, especially if a major threat is not visible, politicians see the military budget as a large pile of pork. Votes are more important than dealing with potential battlefield enemies. So the money goes to sexy weapons and construction projects that will please the voters, who will gratefully reelect their porkmeister representatives. Buying fuel and spare parts for training; it just doesn't work. You need high-profile projects like the F-22, nuclear subs or a new type of army unit specializing in peacekeeping.

It's no secret that ill-trained troops are more likely to get killed in combat. Our government has come up with a novel solution for that problem. The troops are not allowed to get killed. While this sounds absurd, it has worked in the nine-year air war over Iraq, the 1999 air campaign against Serbia and over four years of peacekeeping in the Balkans. Plus operations in Haiti.

While troops and officers steam over the declining readiness levels, the voters are much less concerned. It's understood that we have no threatening enemies. And when the troops are used, they are not allowed to get killed. So why worry about readiness? This is especially true since the policy has appeared to work, especially after eighteen American troops were killed in a battle with Somalis in 1993. The troops and military historians point out that ignoring readiness will be costly when you encounter a fight you cannot avoid. It's not a matter of if this will come, but when. It doesn't matter. This attitude towards readiness has come up time and again throughout recorded history. In other words, it isn't just us.

Readiness is never completely ignored; typically it is provided to those areas where, if something bad happened, there would be severe political repercussions. Thus we strip most of our units to provide readiness in areas like the Persian Gulf, Balkans peacekeeping and commandos (Special Forces.) For example, even the army school system has readiness crises, but two schools with the highest readiness levels are the Special Forces school, and the Chaplain's school. Don't know what to make of that last one.

Changing voters' and politicians' minds on this issue is difficult. If you talk to any combat veteran, especially an infantryman (where most of the casualties happen), you will get more details than the public can effectively absorb. Consider that for infantrymen to survive in combat, they have to learn, and practice, a lot of complex skills. For example, when moving around, a grunt's biggest asset is his ability to see the enemy first. Such skills are taught, They are similar to those an expert hunter uses to find game. There are sighting exercises and drills for looking at some wooded or urban area and being able to quickly spot the enemy, or his weapons. The troops have to get out into the field a lot to practice this. But poor leadership (the good ones tend to get out in peacetime), tight budgets (fuel for the troops' vehicles, batteries for the radios, wear and tear on equipment) or lack of time (sensitivity training and the like often have higher priority) keep the troops out of shape in this vital area.

Another critical combat skill is the proper use of weapons. You don't just fire your weapon in combat; you have to know how to do it to the best effect. Troops have to train together, using live ammunition, so everyone knows where to fire, and how (full automatic, or one shot at a time) in different situations. These skills have to become automatic, and that takes a lot of practice. The well drilled and led American troops in the Persian Gulf war astonished even their commanders with the effectiveness of their fire. Those skills have declined a lot in the last ten years, and if the infantry has to fight today, or tomorrow, a lot more will be killed than in Kuwait.

That brings us to the last, and most ugly, aspect of ignoring readiness. When the unexpected, and unwanted, war does happen, the people responsible for the problem will not suffer. The politicians will, at most, hang out a few generals to twist in the wind. Civilians will say unkind things about the brass. But remember, the reason why a lot of current generals and admirals don't resign in protest over readiness problems is because they know that hardly anyone will notice, and the politicians will find replacements who are more likely to keep their mouths shut. In the meantime, the troops grumble, grab whatever training they can, and pray that they get out before the shooting starts.


Copyright-James F. Dunnigan-2000  

"Dirty Little Secrets" is syndicated by:


"Dirty Little Secrets"
by James F. Dunnigan

Jim Dunnigan



James F Dunnigan works as an advisor and lecturer to the Army War College, State Department, National Defense University, Naval Post Graduate School, CIA, and MORS.
He is the author of over one hundred historical simulations and fifteen books, including the modern military classic "How to Make War," which has been current and in print for 16 years selling over half a million copies.
He serves as a military analyst for NBC and MSNBC, and he also appears frequently as a military affairs commentator for ABC, CBS and CNN as he did throughout the Persian Gulf War.
Mr. Dunnigan served in the U.S. Army from 1961 to 1964, and is a graduate of Columbia University.




Jim Dunnigan @ MSNBC



Write to James Dunnigan at: Dunnigan@Paradigm-TSA.com



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